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BEFORE THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JACQUI C. WALLS, 
Applicant and Petitioner, 
vs. 
UNCLE BARTS, 
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND, 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
Priority No. 7 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This Court has jurisdiction over this Appeal pursuant to 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(a) and Section 35-1-86 Utah Code Annotated 1953 
as amended. 
In this Appeal the Petitioner seeks review of an Order of the 
Utah Industrial Commission denying her claim for benefits. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Did the Commission err when it ruled that the injury did not 
arise out of and in the course of employment. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Standard of Review regarding the issue raised in this 
Appeal: The Appellate Court's Standard of Review is a correction 
of error standard, giving no deference to the agency's decision 
regarding questions of law. Morton International v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991), Questar Pipeline v. Utah 
State Tax Commission, 817 P.2d 316 (Utah 1991). There is no 
implied or expressed grant of authority to the Industrial 
Commission to construe the meaning of Section 45. Cross v. Board 
of Review of the Industrial Commission, 824 P.2d 1202, 1204 (Ut. 
App. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The injured worker filed a claim for benefits. The employer 
answered the application and denied liability. The Administrative 
Law Judge ruled that the injury did not arise out of and in the 
course of employment. This appeal ensued. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Section 35-1-65 Utah Code Annotated, (See Addendum for full 
text). Section 35-1-45 Utah Code Annotated, (See Addendum for full 
text). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts as found by the Administrative Law Judge are as 
follows: 
a. On December 29, 1989 the Applicant was employed by Bart 
Dunston d/b/a Uncle Bart's Tavern as a bartender. (R.36). Uncle 
Bart's was uninsured for Workers Compensation purposes at the time 
of the injury to the injured worker. (R.36). 
b. The Applicant got off work at 5:00 P.M. but remained on 
the premises and played pool and socialized. (R.36). 
c. Following her normal duty hours, the Petitioner attempted 
to ready a keg of beer for tapping, without having been 
specifically requested to do so. (R.38). 
d. While moving the keg of beer the keg fell on the foot of 
Petitioner causing a serious injury. (R.37). 
e. The Applicant filed an Application for Hearing. (R.2). 
f. The employer answered but died before trial. (R.7, 16, 
2 
36). 
g. It was ultimately determined that the estate of the 
employer was insolvent and the Uninsured Employers1 Fund was joined 
as a party. (R.36). 
h. The Administrative Law Judge found that the injury did 
not arise out of and in the course of the Petitioner's employment. 
(R.38). 
i. The Industrial Commission affirmed the finding and ruling 
of the Administrative Law Judge. (R.52). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The conduct undertaken by the injured worker was intended to 
benefit the employer. Therefore the injured worker comes within 
the terms of Section 45 of the Workers Compensation Act and is 
entitled to coverage. 
ARGUMENT 
The Utah Workers Compensation Act, Section 35-1-1 et seq, 
U.C.A. was amended drastically in 1988. Those amendments included 
a change in the language regarding compensability under Section 45 
of the Act. Under the amended version a Claimant is required to 
show that the accident arose out of and in the course of 
employment. The prior language used the disjunctive "or" and was 
considered to be quite a liberal standard. (See M & K Corporation 
v. Industrial Commission, 189 P.2d 132 (1948 Ut.). Therefore, this 




THE INJURY AROSE OUT OF 
THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 
The law regarding the "arising" component of Section 45 of the 
Workers Compensation Act has been long settled. The arising 
component is construed to refer to the origin or cause of the 
action. M & K Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 189 P.2d 132, 
134 (1948 Ut.). 
Professor Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, Section 
6.00 identifies five (5) different approaches to the causative 
interpretation of the "arising out of" component. As reflected by 
Professor Larson, the majority position is a requirement that the 
Claimant show the injury was caused by an increased risk to which 
the Claimant, as distinguished from the general public, is 
subjected by his employment. 
The undisputed factual findings of the Administrative Law 
Judge and the Industrial Commission compel a finding that the 
Claimant's injury arose out of the employment relationship. 
First, even the ALJ found that the Claimant on her own decided 
to ready a new keg of beer. Even though this conduct occurred 
after normal duty hours it can be anticipated that workers will 
sometimes perform conduct which benefits their employers even when 
they are not specifically asked. For example, an employee might 
drive by his place of employment during off duty evening hours and 
observe a fire or crime being committed. If the off duty employee 
decided to extinguish the fire or contact the police regarding the 
burglary there would be benefit to the employer. The question 
4 
becomes whether the employee risk level was increased because of 
the employment relationship and the benefit deriving to the 
employer. 
It should also be clear that a patron of a bar would be 
completely out of line to make ready a keg for the bar. In fact, 
if this Claimant had been at another bar strictly as a patron, she 
would clearly not be within the employment relationship. However, 
the facts in the case at issue are quite to the contrary. 
By the same token, if this Applicant had suffered an injury 
while playing pool (clearly not job related) she could not claim an 
employment relationship. However, the undisputed facts show that 
the Claimant was attempting to make ready a keg of beer (clearly a 
work related activity). 
Argument II 
THE INJURY AROSE DURING THE 
COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT 
Course of Employment Law is well defined in Utah. In the case 
of Black v. McDonald's of Layton, 733 P.2d 154 (Ut. 1987) the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that "To be embraced within the ambit of 
"course of employment", the injury must be received while the 
employee is carrying on work which he is called upon to perform or 
doing some act incidental thereto." (Citations omitted), i.d. 156. 
The court went on to state: "it must occur within the period of 
employment, at a place or area where an employee may reasonably be, 
and while the employee is engaged in an activity at least 
incidental to her employment." (Citations omitted). "The activity 
will be considered incidental to the employee's employment if it 
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advances, directly or indirectly his employer's interests." The 
Administrative Law Judge and the Commission focused their analysis 
of "course of" on the entire period during which the Claimant was 
at the bar following her normal employment hours and found that the 
overall purpose was social. 
The correct analysis requires the Court to analyze that exact 
point in time when the injury occurred. The injury occurred, not 
when the Claimant was socializing, drinking beer or playing pool, 
but when she was readying a keg of beer for tapping. 
1. Had the Claimant been injured while socializing, playing 
pool, or drinking beer, a finding that the injury was not in the 
course of employment would be appropriate. However, the facts of 
this case show that the injury occurred during an attempt to 
benefit the employer. The Utah case law, eg. Black v. McDonald's 
of Layton, 733 P.2d 154 (Ut. 1987) requires the following analysis: 
was the employee performing work which he is called upon to 
perform? The findings of the Administrative Law Judge mandate a 
conclusion that the employment of the Claimant was bartender. It 
follows naturally therefrom that readying a keg of beer for tapping 
is part of a bartender's duty. 
2. Did the injury occur during the period of employment? 
Before considering the second in the analysis it is important to 
note the case of J & W Janitorial v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 
661 P. 2d 949 (Ut. 1983) wherein the Utah Supreme Court stated at 
950 that: "The fact that the fatal accident occurred after work 
hours does not necessarily render the death outside the coverage of 
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the compensation act. (Citation to Larson) . The question is not 
"whether the employee was engaged in only work duties but whether 
the accident occurred as a result of his having engaged in "those 
things which it should reasonably be expected an employee would do 
in connection with those duties." Although the injury took place 
after work hours the falling of the keg onto the foot of the 
Applicant occurred during a period of time during which the 
employee was employed as a bartender. Although not specifically on 
duty at the exact moment of injury, the injury did occur during a 
time period during which the Applicant was employed by the bar. 
3. Did the injury occur in an area where employees may 
reasonably be? It is clear that bartenders must deal with the 
cooler holding refill kegs. 
4. Was there incidental benefit to the employer? Readying 
the keg for tapping was in furtherance of providing customers with 
beer to drink. This is clearly of benefit to the employer. 
CONCLUSION 
The injury suffered by the Claimant took place at least in 
part because the employee was trying to benefit her employer. 
Therefore the Court can and should conclude that the Applicant was 
placed at risk of injury by her job. Clearly the Applicant was 
more at risk than would be the average patron of the bar. 
The conduct relevant herein was an attempt to benefit the 
employer. Therefore the factors with regard to the "course of" 
element militate in favor of coverage. 
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WHEREFORE, Applicant prays for the following relief: 
1. For an Order finding as a matter of law that the injury 
herein arose out of and in the course of the employment of 
Claimant; 
2. For an Order remanding this matter to the Industrial 
Commission for proceedings consistent with a finding of liability. 
DATED this 2"'? day of October, 1992. 
ROBERT BREEZE 
Attorney for Applicant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify I mailed or hand delivered four copies of the 
foregoing Petitioner's brief to: 
THOMAS C. STURDY 
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Box 510250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250 
lL> 
BENJAMIN SIMS 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
Industrial Accident Division 
Box 510250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250 
on this C^J day of October, 1992. 
ROBERT BREEZE 




35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents 
to be paid. 
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is 
injured and the dependents of each such employee 
who is killed, by accident arising out of and in the 
course of his employment, wherever such injury oc-
curred, if the accident was not purposely self-in-
flicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained 
on account of the injury or death, and such amount 
for medical, nurse, and hospital services and medi-
cines, and, in case of death, such amount of funeral 
expenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsi-
bility for compensation and payment of medical, 
nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and fu-
neral expenses provided under this chapter shall be 
on the employer and its insurance carrier and not on 
the employee. 1988 
35-1-65. Temporary disability — Amount of 
payments — State average weekly 
wage defined. 
(1) In case of temporary disability, the employee 
shall receive 662/3% of that employee's average 
weekly wages at the time of the injury so long as such 
disability is total, but not more than a maximum of 
100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of 
the injury per week and not less than a minimum of 
$45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 
for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up 
to a maximum of four such dependent children, not to 
exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at 
the time of the injury, but not to exceed 100% of the 
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week. In no case shall such compensation benefits 
exceed 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury over a 
period of eight years from the date of the injury. 
In the event a light duty medical release is ob-
tained prior to the employee reaching a fixed state of 
recovery, and when no such light duty employment is 
available to the employee from the employer, tempo-
rary disability benefits shall continue to be paid. 
(2) The "state average weekly wage" as referred to 
in Chapters 1 and 2 of this title shall be determined 
by the commission as follows: on or before June 1 of 
each year, the total wages reported on contribution 
reports to the department of employment security un-
der the commission for the preceding calendar year 
shall be divided by the average monthly number of 
insured workers determined by dividing the total in-
sured workers reported for the preceding year by 
twelve. The average annual wage thus obtained shall 
be divided by 52, and the average weekly wage thus 
determined rounded to the nearest dollar. The state 
average weekly wage as so determined shall be used 
as the basis for computing the maximum compensa-
tion rate for injuries or disabilities arising from occu-
pational disease which occurred during the twelve-
month period commencing July 1 following the June 
